Sentence examples for conceptions of propositions from inspiring English sources

There are many different platonistic conceptions of propositions.

A similar distinction may be applied to conceptions of propositions.

Both the Russellian and the Fregean conceptions of propositions are families of theories.

Among conceptions of propositions as structured entities one can distinguish, roughly, between Russellian and Fregean versions.

His basic line is that there are numerous conceptions of propositions, properties, and relations, only one of which, admittedly coarse-grained, is captured by the definitions in §2.1.4.

We will see below that others hold similar "algebraic" conceptions of propositions, where the propositions are complex entities consisting of constituents bound together in certain ways and so are structured propositions.

One motivation for accepting a sparse conception of propositions is expressivism in metaethics.

There is a conception of propositions according to which they are sets of worlds (see e.g. Stalnaker 1976).

For example, George Bealer [1993] formulates what he calls an algebraic conception of propositions (see also Bealer [1982]).

Endorsing such a sparse conception of propositions thus leads to the surprising consequence all moral sentences lack truth-value.

Russell took over from Moore the conception of propositions as mind-independent complexes; a true proposition was then simply identified by Russell with a fact (cf. MTCA, 75 76).