James Mill held something like this functional conception of pleasure (An Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind II, p. 184).
In Principles Chapter IV Bentham sets out his conception of pleasure and utility in more detail, distinguishing between intrinsic and relational dimensions of pleasures.
Sidgwick suggested we and the Stoics share a conception of pleasure as involving not its goodness but only the prima facie appearance that pleasure is good.
The conception of pleasure that Aristotle develops in Book X is obviously closely related to the analysis he gives in Book VII.
However, it is difficult to be sure how much this discussion tells us about Callicles, since it is Socrates who elaborates the conception of pleasure as replenishment on which it depends.
Perhaps the two are markers for fundamentally different affective and motivational states that should be separately designated by more scientific successors to our naive, natural, and undiscriminating common conception of pleasure.
If Mill holds a preference or functional conception of pleasure, according to which pleasures are mental states that the subject prefers and other things being equal would prolong, then perhaps he could claim that pleasures categorically preferred by competent judges are more pleasurable pleasures.
However, during the vogue of 'ordinary language philosophy', between 1949 and 1973, some philosophers writing in English rejected the inclusive conception of pleasure on the basis of claims about the disparate usage of relevant expressions in contemporary English, often emphasizing differences between "enjoying (activities and experiences)" and "being pleased" (by states of affairs or the like).
From such a liberalized Lockean basis, not wholly experiential but not arrived at without experience, a child may, with further experience and learning, progress to a more mature conception of good and thence to the common adult conception of pleasure as feeling that is good.
