"conception of law" is correct and usable in written English.
You could use it when referring to someone's understanding or opinion of a particular law or laws in general. For example: "John held a traditional conception of law, believing that people should obey the rules of the government without question."
The aim of a theory of law, then, would be to systematize these pre-theoretic judgments about the concept of law in order to provide an account of some substantive conception of law.
A new conception of law appeared in France: statute was deemed the basic source of law.
In western democracies, the public conception of law includes justice – in both natural and administrative forms.
"What we are exporting now, just as Britain did in the 19th century, is our conception of law" said Burt Neuborne, a law professor at New York University.
In addition, the sociological supports essential to the continued vitality of the Japanese conception of law are being undercut by the shift from a rural, agricultural economy to an urban, mechanized society.
The liberal position readily concedes that the Constitution specifies the law for the United States but stresses that a fuller, more complete conception of law demands that American law be pictured alongside international law and other (legitimate) national constitutions.
This has led some philosophers of biology to argue for a new conception of laws of nature (Mitchell 2000).
That may be true, on a conception of laws of nature that holds that they are something more than mere patterns in the non-modal phenomena.
In particular, determinism should not be confused with the view of laws that has been called "the governing conception of laws" (Beebee 2000), "the pushy explainer view" (entry on causal determinism), and, most commonly, "the necessitarian view".
Armstrong abandons the Humean account of universal laws as constant conjunctions and of statistical laws as relative frequencies, which are both extensional in character, for the alternative conception of laws as intensional relations between properties, which are connected by (what he characterizes as) primitive relations of necessitation and of probabilification, respectively.
It is natural to connect this conception of laws with unificationist approaches to explanation: if laws are generalizations that play a central role in the achievement of simple (and presumably unified) deductive systemizations, then by appealing to laws in explanation, we achieve explanatory unification this makes it intelligible why it is desirable that explanations invoke laws[32].
