Sentence examples for conception of consciousness from inspiring English sources

For more on Sartre, see Linsenmayer's post — this time a podcast for Partially Examined Life — on Sartre's conception of consciousness and selfhood.

We may liken his conception of consciousness, then, to a single, general psychic activity call it "representing"—which, like the surface of a pool in a rainstorm, is disturbed by multitudinous sensory contact with realia.

If that is right, the notions of epiphenomenal qualia and zombies imply a conception of consciousness which requires people to be in epistemic contact with their qualia, yet also rules out the possibility of such contact: a contradiction.

Brentano subscribed to a two-component conception of consciousness: in perceiving an object, we are aware not only of the object presented in perception, but also of our perceiving of that object.

Such a conception of consciousness finds some support in a tendency to say that conscious states of mind are those one is 'conscious of' or 'aware of' being in, and to interpret this 'of' to indicate some kind of reflexivity is involved — wherein one represents one's own mental representations (Rosenthal 1986 , 1991 1993, 2002b).

The 'way of seeming' or 'what it's like' conception of consciousness I have just invoked is sometimes marked by the term 'phenomenal consciousness.' But this qualifier 'phenomenal' suggests that there are other kinds of consciousness (or perhaps, other senses of 'consciousness'consciousness

Because Marxism considers social classes to have objective identities and interests, its conception of class consciousness includes the possibility of its antithesis: false consciousness.

In 1965, after a difficult month on a steamship, a spiritual leader named Bhaktivedanta Swami Srila Prabhupada arrived in New York convinced that if Americans would embrace his conception of Krishna consciousness, the other countries in the world would follow.

If this conception of both consciousness and its contents is correct, antirealism looms large on the horizon.

The panpsychist position would clearly fail if there was a clear and uncontroversial conception of how consciousness emerges, in an ontological rather than epistemological sense, from entirely non-mentalistic physical features, but at present we simply do not possess such a conception, although many controversial suggestions are in play.

In his account of how it is possible for us to perceive a temporally extended phenomena such as a melody, Meinong (1899) defended a Retentional conception of time consciousness along the same general lines as Brentano's, but he also emphasised some relevant distinctions.