The issue here seems to be more than simply one about how well the underlying theory of action and belief works for extreme values, but also about the relevant conception of rational belief.
This conception of 'renouncing beliefs' is very odd, as if we're in some kind of religious cult.
Just as our conception of the aim of belief influences our conception of the doxastic norms, so does it affect the extent to which parallels can be drawn between the ethics of belief and the ethics of action generally.
A lot of the work of this argument consists in debunking naturalist and expressivist conceptions of moral belief as inadequate for our deliberative purposes.
Thus, on this model, the asymmetry in attributions is a distortion of the correct conception of intentionality (desire, belief, etc).
It seems possible to defend the view, for instance, that we ought only to believe on sufficient evidence as the Evidentialists teach but that our conception of the aims of belief might provide further and more determinate necessary conditions for permissible belief.
Analysis of multiple data sources revealed that conceptions of identity, beliefs of the nature of the virtual world, and technical skill were primary factors which affected group cohesion and learning within the community.
These consist of non-inferentially held beliefs, so they fit the belief conception of fallacies rather than the argument conception.
According to Reid, in such cases, it is pressure sensations which, Reid stresses, largely go unnoticed and unnamed that immediately produce in us a "conception and belief" of the table that it is hard.
Academic writers who have given the most attention to the subject of fallacies insist on, or at least prefer, the argument conception of fallacies, but the belief conception is prevalent in popular and non-scholarly discourse.
