They question conceptions of well-being that give a central role to the possession or exercise of the standard array of physical and mental functions, as those conceptions imply, or are often taken to imply, that well-being is precluded or diminished merely by the absence or limitation of those functions.
Indeed, an expressivist may invoke a deflationary conception of truth to support the idea that we can speak of justified moral beliefs that are "true" — without implying that justified moral beliefs accurately represent moral reality.
(The pragmatic, or pragmaticistic, conception of meaning implies that two theories with exactly the same empirical content must have, despite superficial appearances, the same meaning).
Likewise, his critique of the Cartesian conception of matter implies that the properties of bodies are not limited to their passive powers, that bodies must always admit of intrinsic variety, and that ordinary physical objects such as desks and chairs must be ontologically dependent upon a deeper level of metaphysical reality.
Strictly interpreted, this conception might imply that whatever is once understood has become a piece of knowledge, and thus guides our action (see I. Hadot 1969, 106).
Nevertheless, this passage shows how Kant's conception of moral obligation implies that morality and its basic principles have a purely rational source.
This is particularly relevant to cognitive science because new concepts and relations can be created on the fly, and under the standard conception of neural networks this implies that neurons and connections would be created impossibly rapidly.
It certainly matches with our conception of the word Universe, which implies that this is all of space and all the matter and energy within it.
This implies that the liberal conception of justice, and the legitimation of political power more generally, can be specified and justified without crucial reference to controversial conceptions of value and moral principles (what Rawls calls "comprehensive moral conceptions" (Rawls 1993, 13 15).
