On this conception, legal evidence is that which counts as evidence in law.
As Williamson (2000) has forcefully emphasized, however, embracing the judgement that the thinker is equally rational in 'the good case' and 'the bad case' tends to push one inexorably towards a conception of evidence according to which one's evidence is exhausted by one's subjective, non-factive mental states.
As we have seen, it is the desire to preserve the intuition that a sufficiently scrupulous thinker in the bad case can be reasonable in his beliefs (indeed, no less reasonable than a similarly scrupulous thinker in the good case) which seems to rule out any conception of evidence according to which one's evidence might consist of (say) true propositions or facts about the external world.
For example, a number of comments Reid makes indicate that he appears to have a psychological conception of evidence whereby what is evident forces assent.
Even if one abandons the phenomenal conception of evidence, however, one might hold on to the idea that one's evidence includes one's experiences, inasmuch as one's experiences can and often do make some difference to what one is justified in believing, regardless of whether one forms beliefs about those experiences themselves.
A rigid, or "non-fluid" conception of evidence would have renounced further attention to co-Q10 once we already had "evidence" showing it didn't work.
The same holds for Williamson's conception of evidence as knowledge: inasmuch as any known proposition is true, inconsistency with one's evidence entails inconsistency with some truth.
In this respect, such views are incompatible not only with the phenomenal conception of evidence but also with views that would rule out the objects of introspection as evidence on the grounds that the objects of introspection lack the objectivity and publicity that is characteristic of genuine evidence.
According to Williamson's conception of evidence as knowledge, one's experiences are excluded from counting as evidence at best, one's evidence includes whatever propositions about one's experiences that one knows.
Patient organisation representatives reported interacting with other stakeholders (especially industry) to increase the influence of their conception of evidence on decision making.
This section picks up on the fourth conception of evidence.
