Descartes himself argued from his ability clearly and distinctly to conceive mind and body as distinct beings to the conclusion that they really are separate substances.
This means that to bring about this translation we have absolutely no need of "dictionary" mediation consisting of mental pictures, as classical cognitivism suggested, conceiving the mind as a functional system whose processes can be described as manipulations of information symbols based on a series of formal syntax rules.
Although these papers exhibit a rather unclear mixture of views, they are now remembered primarily for having ushered in the position known as "eliminative materialism", according to which our way of conceiving the mind and mental phenomena amounts to a seriously inadequate theory which is in conflict with a (materialistic) scientific account of those same things.
32 Throughout this manuscript we have strived to illustrate how conceiving the mind as embodied and relational can transform the advancement of knowledge and the development of interventions aimed at treating or preventing disability and chronic health conditions in aging.
We argue that conceiving the mind as embodied and relational will grow scientific inquiry in aging, transform how we think about the self-system and well-being, and lead us to rethink health promotion interventions aimed at aging individuals and populations.
The fundamental message is that conceiving the mind as embodied and relational will grow scientific inquiry in aging, transform how we think about the self-system and well-being, and lead us to rethink health promotion interventions aimed at aging individuals and populations.
65, 66 Conceiving the mind as embodied and relational dovetails nicely with the growing literature on successful aging 67– 70 and may serve to further strengthen the development of health promotion interventions in aging that would complement work on therapeutic and disease prevention.
Descartes argues, via that claim, from his ability to clearly and distinctly conceive of mind apart from body and vice versa, to the conclusion that mind and body are really distinct (i.e., are two substances, not one).
The usual starting point of the theory of intentionality can be rendered as follows: (1) intentionality is taken to be a feature of minds, (2) minds are to be conceived as individual minds (or minds of individuals), and (3) it seems that each individual has his or her own mind.
If the mind can conceive it, the mind can achieve it.
