Exact(1)
Descartes himself argued from his ability clearly and distinctly to conceive mind and body as distinct beings to the conclusion that they really are separate substances.
Similar(59)
On the one hand, he attempts to get our knowledge grounded as firmly as possible on extra-mental things: a concept simply is the intellected extra-mental particular in a different type of being from that which it has extra-mentally, a type of being that is nevertheless intrinsic to the extra-mental particular; the concept offers no barrier whatsoever between conceiving mind and conceived object.
Descartes argues, via that claim, from his ability to clearly and distinctly conceive of mind apart from body and vice versa, to the conclusion that mind and body are really distinct (i.e., are two substances, not one).
If the mind can conceive it, the mind can achieve it.
The argument seems intended to establish that we cannot actually conceive of mind-independent objects, that is, objects existing unperceived and unthought of.
A more charitable reading of the argument (see Winkler 1989, 184 7; Lennon 1988) makes Berkeley's point that we cannot represent unconceivedness, because we have never and could never experience it.[7] Because we cannot represent unconceivedness, we cannot conceive of mind-independent objects.
This means that to bring about this translation we have absolutely no need of "dictionary" mediation consisting of mental pictures, as classical cognitivism suggested, conceiving the mind as a functional system whose processes can be described as manipulations of information symbols based on a series of formal syntax rules.
Although these papers exhibit a rather unclear mixture of views, they are now remembered primarily for having ushered in the position known as "eliminative materialism", according to which our way of conceiving the mind and mental phenomena amounts to a seriously inadequate theory which is in conflict with a (materialistic) scientific account of those same things.
32 Throughout this manuscript we have strived to illustrate how conceiving the mind as embodied and relational can transform the advancement of knowledge and the development of interventions aimed at treating or preventing disability and chronic health conditions in aging.
We argue that conceiving the mind as embodied and relational will grow scientific inquiry in aging, transform how we think about the self-system and well-being, and lead us to rethink health promotion interventions aimed at aging individuals and populations.
The fundamental message is that conceiving the mind as embodied and relational will grow scientific inquiry in aging, transform how we think about the self-system and well-being, and lead us to rethink health promotion interventions aimed at aging individuals and populations.
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Justyna Jupowicz-Kozak
CEO of Professional Science Editing for Scientists @ prosciediting.com