Sentence examples for computational state from inspiring English sources

The second contends that the same mental kind can be a property of systems that are not in the same (Turing) computational state.

Since the rock's physical state transitions that map onto the NOT gate's computational state transitions do not support counterfactuals, the rock does not implement the NOT gate according to the counterfactual account.

Clause (ii) requires that for any computational state transition of the form s1 → s2 (specified by the computational description C), if the system is in the physical state that maps onto s1, it then goes into the physical state that maps onto s2.

Godfrey-Smith argues that for a mapping to constitute a genuine implementation, the microscopic physical states that are clustered together (to correspond to a given computational state) must be physically similar to one another — there cannot be arbitrary groupings of arbitrarily different physical states, as in the arguments for unlimited pancomputationalism.

As the simple mapping account has it, clause (ii) requires that for any computational state transition of the form s1 → s2 (specified by a computational description), if the system is in the physical state that maps onto s1, it then goes into the physical state that maps onto s2.

Since the rock's physical state transitions that map onto the NOT gate's computational state transitions are not grounded in either the causal or dispositional properties of the rock and its states, the rock does not implement the NOT gate according to the causal and dispositional accounts.

In cognitive science since the middle of the twentieth century, psychological states and mechanisms have largely been understood in computational and materialist terms, that is, that the mind is the brain, and that brain states and mechanisms are essentially computational states and computers respectively (though almost certainly not serial computers).

Unlike the computational states of digital computers, qubits are not unambiguously distinguishable from one another.

(Of course, these same computational states may also cause any number of other nonrational effects—e.g., dreading, cursing, or experiencing a shot of adrenaline at the prospect of the labour involved).

Mechanistic computationalists typically individuate computational states non-semantically.

Thus, there are not enough computational states for the physical states to map onto.