The naive comprehension principle faces several problems.
On the other hand, there have been many suggestions for restricting the Comprehension Principle for Concepts.
The naive comprehension principle faced the problem of generating an existent winged horse.
By the naive comprehension principle this condition determines an object and that object is self-distinct.
How do these distinctions solve the problems raised above for the naive comprehension principle?
Finally, Russell's worry that a Meinongian comprehension principle generates existent winged horses can be answered.
A naive comprehension principle generates objects that violate the principle of noncontradiction.
The comprehension principle is then restricted to conditions involving only nuclear predicates.
One simple solution is to restrict the comprehension principle to total conditions.
By the naive comprehension principle, there is an object with exactly these features.
This, in effect, is the Comprehension Principle for Concepts discussed in the main text.
