By introducing n (>1) firms with infinite cross-price elasticity (i.e. generic drugs), we explore the effects of competition on the optimal pricing strategies under a Reference Pricing Scheme (RPS).
We also find that the loss of thermoelectric power due to the temperature nonuniformity of the two plates competes with the power lost during the pumping of the two streams, and that from this competition results the optimal mass flow rates of the two streams.
It gets plenty wrong – and is rightfully pilloried for it – but under both David Gallop and David Smith, the competition has hit the optimal level of competitive balance.
These studies did not, however, quantify the mortality risk prior to female emergence or the level of male competition on which the optimal relative emergence time will depend.
Drawing from the well-known framework of spatial models of imperfect competition, we argue that while neither public nor private competition may lead to the optimal corporate law regimes, there are at least some reasons to believe that private provision may be preferable.
Then we build a leader follower Stackelberg competition model to derive the optimal facility location design when one of the companies has the first mover advantage over its competitor.
Furthermore, the degree of competition can also affect the optimal levels of relatedness within hosts.
Using these competition experiments, we studied the optimal memory traits for different pathogen environments.
For example, Eaton and Grossmann showed that if the firms compete in prices rather in quantities (Bertrand competition rather than Cournot) then the optimal policy is an export tax rather a subsidy – a policy rarely used in practice, politically unpopular and contrary to protectionist sentiment which generally touted New Trade Theory models as an argument for their favored policies.
For a given population, a reduction in a limiting factor will increase the degree to which adding individuals will reduce fitness, and hence it can be modelled by setting c > 1. Increasing the effect of adding individuals will reduce the equilibrium population abundance, but not the level of competition at this equilibrium, nor the optimal solution to the r/ α trade-off (Fig. 2).
By contrast, our model provides a prediction for the optimal level of competition when the level of policing (a) lies between the two stable solutions (1 and 0).
