Two types of compatibilist response, however, deserve special mention.
This compatibilist response turns away from the Garden of Forking Paths model of control and seeks to ground an agent's control over his action in other features of his or her agency.
However, the compatibilist can reply that this is inconsistent with Oscar being slow switched (Brueckner 1997a).
What is the compatibilist to say in response to van Inwagen's point?
In response, the compatibilist is forced, I think, to deny that its being true that a golfer could have holed the putt, or even that he could have holed the putt in precisely the same conditions, entails that he would have holed the putt in a perfect duplicate of the actual world.
However, in response, the classical compatibilist holds that that the conditional analysis brings into relief a rich picture of freedom.
In addition to the foregoing compatibilist solutions, there are two incompatibilist responses to the problem of theological fatalism.
Incompatibilists are commonly thought to have the edge here; even some philosophers with compatibilist leanings are prepared to concede the incompatibilist her point about the "typical" response tendencies (e.g., Vargas 2004, forthcoming).
One response that is natural is to make a distinction between two kinds of compatibilist project.
An early response to the Consequence argument was to argue that Beta is invalid because a compatibilist account of ability to do otherwise is correct (Gallois 1977, Narveson 1977, Foley 1979, Slote 1982, Flint 1987).
Incompatibilists were unmoved by this response, saying, in effect, that the validity of Beta is more plausible than the correctness of any compatibilist account of ability to do otherwise.
