Sentence examples for comparative plausibility from inspiring English sources

See Chellas (1980, 193-194) for a concise critical discussion of the comparative plausibility of these two formuli under their standard possible worlds interpretation.

It only need draw on bounds on comparative plausibility ratios, and these bounds only play a significant role while evidence remains fairly sparse.

Furthermore, presumably, in scientific contexts the comparative plausibility values for hypotheses should depend on explicit plausibility arguments (stated within b), not on privately held opinions.

Indeed, the drift hypothesis is itself strongly supported by the evidence; for, no alternative hypothesis that has the slightest amount of comparative plausibility can account for the available evidence nearly so well.

It shows how the impact of evidence (in the form of likelihood ratios) combines with comparative plausibility assessments of hypotheses (in the form of ratios of prior probabilities) to provide a net assessment of the extent to which hypotheses are refuted or supported via contests with their rivals.

The weight of evidence for the existence of the key causal factor consists of the comparative plausibility of the alternative accounts the one that invokes it and the one that denies it.

Such comparative plausibilities are much easier to assess than specific numerical prior plausibility values for individual hypotheses.

Thus, although prior probabilities may be subjective in the sense that agents may disagree on the relative strengths of plausibility arguments—and so disagree on the comparative plausibilities of various hypotheses the priors used in scientific contexts should not represent mere subjective whims.

These axioms make plausibility relations weak partial orderings on the relative plausibility of sentences.

The members of a scientific community may quite legitimately revise their (comparative) prior plausibility assessments for hypotheses from time to time as they rethink plausibility arguments and bring new considerations to bear.

So, although there may well be disagreement among agents regarding the ranges of comparative prior plausibilities of hypotheses, a probabilistic inductive logic may easily represent this diversity.