(4) Cooperative constraints Apes experience personal intentions, and use communication signals to communicate intentions to others, but they appear to be unable to share their intentions with others i.e. they lack a 'we-intentionality' as it is typical for humans.
The idea was that genuine communication is essentially open: the speaker's communicative intentions are meant to be fully accessible to the hearer.
All in all, the complexity and sophistication required of asserters by these communication-intentions accounts, gives a reason to suspect that they do not provide necessary conditions for making assertions.
In his inaugural lecture of 1969, 'Meaning and Truth', Strawson spoke of a 'Homeric struggle' between theorists of formal semantics, as represented in their different ways by Frege, the early Wittgenstein and Chomsky, and theorists of communication-intention, as represented by Austin, Paul Grice and the later Wittgenstein (1969, 171-2).
Intentions that are immediately concerned with communication itself, as opposed to ulterior goals, are called communicative intentions.
In studies focussing on social insurance physician-claimant communication, the intentions and behaviour of the claimants were found to be just as important as the intentions and behaviour of the physicians.
So even before we get to what is said, communication involves intentions on the part of the speaker that go beyond what she "codes-up" into language, and inferences on the part of the hearer that go beyond decoding.
Effectiveness is measured under the assumption of perfect communication where intentions of the other players are transparent.
Therefore, when a study shows an effect of threatening communication on intention, but fails to measure behaviour, it is possible that the fear appeal is not associated to, or even decreases, the desirable behaviour.
