Sentence examples for common supposition from inspiring English sources

The personal and common supposition is twofold.

The first principle was a common supposition in Bayle's day, and so obviously caused no controversy.

The first division is into suppositio communis (common supposition) and suppositio discreta (discrete supposition)—e.g., the terms homo (man) and Sortes (Socrates) respectively.

This gloss of the common supposition is intended to be neutral on the controversy between judgmentalists, who hold that emotions essentially involve beliefs or judgments, and their opponents.

A common supposition among the financially naive is that you should take out a mortgage, whether you need one or not, because the tax deduction for the interest will leave you better off.

Common supposition is divided into 'determinate supposition', in which one refers to everything falling under the term's signification disjunctively, as in 'some man runs' = 'this man or that man or the other man... runs', and 'confused supposition', in which the term refers to everything falling under its signification, but not disjunctively.

Common suppositions for this sudden change are family pressure and the wish to avoid being raped in retaliation for dressing secularly.

A final complication came at the end of the fourteenth century and subsequently, when it was asked: "Are there only three modes of common personal supposition?" Some answered, 'Yes'; but others distinguished two modes of merely confused supposition, or equivalently distinguished a fourth case, 2 (iii), collective supposition, where descent was permissible to a proposition with a conjunctive term.

Several recent commentators have asked what the medieval theory of modes of common personal supposition was: was it a theory of inference, of quantification, of truth-conditions, of fallacies, or what?

A lot of people right now make the common-sense supposition that if extremist ideologies have lately entered a sort of grisly golden age, the Bush administration's all-too-predictable blundering in Iraq must bear the blame.

Or so we argue in Part I. Worse, confusions over rights and powers, when combined with a particular understanding of what constitutes clear-eyed analysis of legal issues, has contributed to the now-widely shared but mistaken supposition that common law reasoning must (or should) take the form of instrumental reasoning.