Such accounts have a nice story to tell about the relationship between credential states and partial intentions they are species of the same genus, in the sense that they involve not full but partial commitment to the proposition or action in question.
To take (2), the more abstract description simply attributes that property of specifying a certain degree of commitment to the proposition to these sentences, for this is the definition of what it is to be a member of the category modalization (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014: 177).3 In the more delicate cases (4a).
Still, it does incur a commitment to the truth of the proposition that there are black swans.
The special role of faith-propositions It may be argued (again, by Bayesians, for example) that once practical commitment to the truth of propositions is recognised as a matter of degree, there are no possible circumstances where 'the evidence does not decide', and so no occasion for faith as doxastic venture.
Plato agrees: he regards a commitment to the existence of propositions as evidence of Platonism, acceptance of the claim that abstract objects (and plenty of them) genuinely exist.
Newton's fallibilism includes commitment to the truth of the propositions within one's scientific theory until it is proven to be false.
MODALITY has been studied from the perspectives of semantics (speaker's commitment to the truth value of the proposition) (Lyons 1977, Perkins 1983, Biber et al. 1999, Palmer 2003), pragmatics (Coates 1987, 1990, Holmes 1984, Hyland 1994, Myers 1989), and interpersonal interaction (Butler 1988, He 1993, Camiciottoli, Belinda Crawford 2004, Gao 2012, White 2000, 2003).
Trusting God, however, entails practical commitment to the truth of theological faith-propositions (though the converse entailment fails)—and commitment to the truth of a proposition in one's practical reasoning is under direct voluntary control.
Now, whether practical commitment to the truth of a given faith-proposition does or does not venture beyond adequate evidential support will be relative to assumptions about (a) where the level of evidential support required for 'adequacy' should be set, and (b) just how firm and decisive propositional faith-commitment needs to be.
Semantic nonfactualism, the non-cognitivist commitment to the view that moral judgments do not express propositions or predicate properties, rules out one simple way of explaining matters.
Yet although philosophical propositions cannot be accommodated within Humean epistemology, accepting them does not entail a commitment to the metaphysics which Hume wanted to reject.
