There are many, many reasons that MTV's flagship live event is no longer any fun — deriding television personalities is done better by actually funny people on the free Internet and the free TV, some stars cannot sing credibly on stage, etc. — but one big reason the show is no longer a coherent proposition: MTV doesn't show a lot of videos.
If there is, a new proposition (not already in the set of coherent proposition) is required, and a regress is clearly in the offing; or there is no such reason and, then, coherence appears to be an arbitrarily selected property with which to designate warranted propositions.
Many standard accounts of the nature of law hold that law presumes and reflects a world-view in which the goal is to achieve a set of presumptively coherent propositions.
That is, it appears that the coherentist is now explicitly assigning some initial autonomous warrant to all of the individual propositions in a set of coherent propositions that possess P which does not depend upon the warrant of any other proposition in the set.
Gregory Landini (1998) has proposed that there is indeed a coherent semantics for propositions and propositional functions in PM, which treats functions and propositions as linguistic entities.
Coherence The proposition that bed sharing is causally related to SIDS is coherent with theories that respiratory obstruction, re-breathing expired gases, and thermal stress (or overheating), which may also give rise to the release of lethal toxins, 33 are all mechanisms leading to SIDS, in the absence of smoking, alcohol or drugs.
In other words, a measure of coherence is doxastically truth conducive just in case a more coherent set of believed propositions is jointly more probable than a less coherent set of believed propositions.
Coherence is a relation between bits of evidence: the more coherent the evidence for a proposition, the more the evidence justifies believing it.
One important branch of medieval logic developed in treatises called De obligationibus dealt, roughly speaking, with how an increasing set of true and false propositions might remain coherent.
Alexy and Peczenik recognise that weighing and balancing the criteria of coherence will be a complex matter, but appear to assume that it will always be possible to establish which is the most coherent of rival sets of propositions.
In other words, the coherentist appears to be assigning to each of the propositions in the coherent set what we have called the autonomous bit of warrant and, once again, the dilemma facing the foundationalist returns.
