First, knowledge is a "valuable and desirable cognitive state" indicative of "full cognitive success".
Indeed, if anything, we would think that her cognitive success was down to her informant's cognitive abilities.
The three components of the traditional view of knowledge thus fit together "cohesively" to explain why knowledge is valued as a state of full cognitive success.
That is, Greco argues that achievements are successes that are because of ability, and thus, given that on his view knowledge is cognitive success (i.e., true belief) that is because of cognitive ability, knowledge is cognitive achievement.
According to Scherkoske "Integrity is an epistemic virtue: that is, it is a stable disposition that reliably places its possessor in good epistemic position and leads to cognitive success" (Scherkoske 2011, 196).
(Prauss 1981 argues that Kant failed to achieve this insight, in part because he did not appreciate how cognitive success is a fundamentally practical goal. Förster 1992 discusses Kant's reflections on this topic in his final manuscript, the Opus Postumum).
However, he always stressed that every form of progress in reism, even regional or local, is a cognitive success, because it introduces a language which is free of the dangers that result from using abstract words.
As we saw in the main entry, assessing methods by how well they do vis-a-vis these criteria of cognitive success leads to restrictions on inductive inferences in the short run, sometimes very strong restrictions.
Fodor (2000, 68) takes this argument to rest on the unwarranted assumption that there is no domain-independent criterion of cognitive success, which he thinks requires an argument that evolutionary psychologists do not provide.
