In Wolff's description of the experience of beauty as the "sensitive cognition of perfection," cognition is naturally understood as knowledge of truth, so in the first instance Wolff's formula meant that the experience of beauty is knowledge of truth by means of the senses.
The opposite of all three types of defect is described in NB 4.1.4 as knowledge of truth (tattvajñāna), right knowledge (samyaṅmati), truthful cognition (āryaprajñā) and right apprehension (sambodha).
But the cognition of the truth of the thing only occurs in a judgment, when the intellect judges the adequacy of the thing to its exemplar.
Despite the connection between logic and knowledge, however, Bosanquet denied that he was doing epistemology in the sense of a theory of cognition in which truth and reality are treated as independent of one another.
Ordinarily, the faculty of cognition aims at truth, and the faculty of desire aims at action.
This rejoinder virtually amounts to the statement of a realist conception of truth: in cases where our initial cognition is overridden, the initial cognition was false all along; all that changes is our awareness thereof.
The seventeenth-century French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) farguedy argued that 'we see all things in God.' This doctrine of 'Vision in God' is intended as an account both of sense perception of material things and of the purely intellectual cognition of mathematical objects and abstract truths.
Kant: "The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement of [a cognition] with its object, is assumed as granted" (1787, B82).
Pārthasārathi thus separates the (subjective, epistemic) state of justification from the (objective) fact of truth, and clarifies that what is intrinsic to cognition has to do with the former.
Most importantly however, according to Kant the "nominal definition" of truth is that it is the "agreement" or "correspondence" (Übereinstimmung) of a cognition (i.e., in this context, an objectively valid judgment) with its object (A58/B82).
