The conception of human rights as natural rights (as opposed to a classical natural order of obligation) was made possible by certain basic societal changes, which took place gradually beginning with the decline of European feudalism from about the 13th century and continuing through the Renaissance to the Peace of Westphalia (1648).
However, American liberals of the classical variety have no obligation to do what foreign liberals desire.
Stephen Neff wrote that "the term 'war guilt' is a slight unfortunate one, since to lawyers, the term 'guilt' primarily connotes criminal liability" while "the responsibility of Germany envisaged in the Versailles Treaty ... was civil in nature, comparable to the indemnity obligation of classical just-war theory".
For example, opponents often charge that classical utilitarians cannot explain our obligations to keep promises and not to lie when no pain is caused or pleasure is lost.
Obligations were classified by classical jurists into two main categories, according to whether they arose from delict or contract.
One classical account of political authority has modeled political authority and the attendant obligations on the obligations of family and the authority of the parents.
Studying these suggestions yields insight into the strengths and weaknesses of accounts that understand contract, in the classical manner, as a free-standing form of chosen obligation.
This renders classical-liberalism or libertarianism, including its feminist versions, blind to the nature of obligations to, and entitlements of, children and others who require care.
Again, in the classical variant the relevant norm claims that one has both a right and an obligation ("a sacred duty") to promote such a tradition.
The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism; its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned, including for the individual members of the ethno-nation.
