We also extend this result to normal programs with constraints and choice rules.
Even non-monotonic social choice rules can be implemented using Nash equilibrium refinements.
We study the profit maximization problem of the suppliers under binary and proportional customer choice rules, assuming that they make their decisions simultaneously.
But in some environments where the agentsʼ utilities are stochastically correlated, other dominant-strategy choice rules are better for all agents.
In many environments, the majority voting rule maximizes agentsʼ ex-ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant-strategy implementable choice rules.
In both cases, school choice rules narrow the range between the highest and lowest quality schools compared to neighborhood assignment rules, and these changes in school quality are capitalized into equilibrium housing prices.
The applications considered include agenda formation in legislatures, government formation in parliamentary systems, the implications of legislative structure, elections and information aggregation, lobbying, electoral competition and interest groups, the control of bureaucracies, interest group competition, and collective choice rules.
This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society.
Another significant issue is that the White House initiatives, like the charitable choice rules, allow groups that receive government money to discriminate based on religion in deciding whom to hire and fire.
A report released last month by the Center for Public Justice found that 37 states had not implemented charitable choice rules that require removing the restrictions on financing for religious groups.
Furthermore, we discuss the mechanism with transfers and prove that some important social choice rules are doubly implemented in Nash and M-Nash equilibria by the mechanism with transfers.
