Sentence examples for characterize truth from inspiring English sources

First, there are various semantic structures available to characterize "truth" in a model.

The formulation of the aim of Montague semantics mentioned in the introduction ('to characterize truth and entailment of sentences') suggests that the method is restricted to declarative sentences.

John Dewey (1938) seems to have been the first to characterize truth in terms of assertoric correctness, with his notion of warranted assertibility, even though this idea had a clear affinity with the verifiability principle of Moritz Schlick (1936).

In some of these cases, this attitude is explained by a distrust of notions that are thought not to have reached a fully respectable scientific status, like the strong modal notions; it is frequently accompanied in such authors, who are often practicing logicians, by the proposal to characterize logical truth as a species of validity (in the sense of 2.3 below).

Thornton Wilder characterized this truth in "The Bridge of San Luis Rey," writing, "There is a land of the living and a land of the dead and the bridge is love, the only survival, the only meaning".

Formal semantics for a logic provides a definition of validity by characterizing the truth behavior of the sentences of the system.

I'm not saying I want the president to smack him in the mouth for lying and mis-characterizing the truth, as Romney did so well during the last debate in Denver.

Truthiness is a quality characterizing a "truth" that a person making an argument or assertion claims to know intuitively "from the gut" or because it "feels right" without regard to evidence, logic, intellectual examination, or facts.

States of affairs might hence be characterized as truth-makers and the corresponding logical propositions as truth-bearers.

It is not true, however, that they take the form of statements of fact, even highly general statements of fact; nor is their necessity the same as that which characterizes logical truths.

Kant characterizes analytic truths as those where the concept of the predicate is contained in or identical with the concept of the subject, and, more fundamentally, as those whose denial is contradictory.