Sentence examples for character of perception from inspiring English sources

I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top-down character of perception.

Dharmakīrti's intuition in this regard was that it is especially in virtue of the causally describable character of perception that it is thus to be privileged, since on his view, the capacity to interact causally with other particulars is what distinguishes anything as really existent.

Though setting himself squarely against the perils of loose speculation, he also rejected a reductionist account of behaviourism that he associated with Watson and Pavlov, which to him made simplistic links between human and animal investigations, ignoring the selective and constructive character of perception and memory, and the cultural context in which these operated.

However, for reasons explained in the previous section, Martin argues that the disjunctivist who is a naïve realist about the phenomenal character of veridical perception (and so who holds that veridical perceptions have phenomenal properties that hallucinations cannot possess) should reject Dancy's proposal.

To use the well-known case of the melody, moments of quality and of intensity form in that case a unitary whole which is perceptible as a "quality of form," and it is precisely the unitary character of this perception, the fact that it is perceptible in one stroke and immediately as unitary form, that Stumpf tries to account for with the aid of the notion of relation of fusion.

The naïve realist about phenomenal character instead claims that the right account of the phenomenal character of veridical perception should appeal to the idea that such experience relates to the mind-independent items perceived in a non-representational manner.

Speaking once again of the composite character of sense perception, he writes: 'There is always a clear idea and a confused sensation in the view we have of sensible objects.

It might now be objected that this disjunctivist response still introduces a common element to veridical perception and causally matching hallucination that screens off the explanatory role that the naïve realist assigns to his distinctive account of the phenomenal character of veridical perception.

This is particularly true in the case of Vision in God, which bears a striking resemblance to Augustine's theory of divine illumination, but which is also informed by Cartesian views about the role of ideas in cognition and the intellectual character of sensory perception.

So in order to preserve his naïve realist account of the phenomenal character of genuine perceptions, Martin advocates a disjunctive account of perceptual experience.

If introspective reflection supports a naïve realist account of the phenomenal character of genuine perceptions, then presumably introspective reflection should lend the same support to a naïve realist account of the phenomenal character of hallucinations that are introspectively indiscriminible from genuine perceptions.