A fuller discussion of explication is provided in the first chapter of Logical Foundations of Probability (1950 [Quotation]), where Carnap offers criteria of adequacy for explication, and gives as his main example the concept of temperature as explicating the vaguer concept of warmth.
With this general background on our two great principles in place, together with how these principles operate in Wolff (sometimes in contrast with how they operate in Leibniz), we now turn to a consideration of how these principles operate in Du Châtelet's opening chapter of the Foundations.
In this chapter, design of foundations in rock is considered.
This meeting has been called the capitulum fundationis ("chapter, or meeting, of foundation").
The first ten chapters of the Foundations provide the epistemology, metaphysics and theorizing on scientific methodology that is meant to provide the foundations for the remaining chapters on Newtonian physics.
The second chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, the Dynamics, considers how it is possible to experience matter as filling a determinate region in space.
The final chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, the Phenomenology, focuses on how the motion of matter can be experienced modally, that is, in terms of it being possibly, actually, or necessarily in motion.
The first chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, the Phoronomy, considers the quantity of motion of matter and how it is to be constructed in intuition a priori (so as to produce the kind of rules that are necessary for our experience of matter in motion).
Moreover, even if one can find an appropriately nuanced sense in which the concept of matter is empirical while still allowing for an appropriate kind of necessity, questions can still be posed about the "new determinations" that are to be added to that concept in each chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations.
For example, what is the justification for each specific determination that is added when one thinks of matter as having a quantity, a quality, etc.? Also, what is the relationship between each new determination of matter and the various claims that Kant makes in each chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations?
For a detailed analysis of the seventh and eighth chapters of the Foundations in order to make sense of the relation between Leibnizian and Newtonian ideas therein, see Gireau-Geneaux 2001, 173 186.
