On the matter of choice: though I hate engaging in this diversionary and pointless debate on the "causation" of same-sex attractions, for the sake of argument, if these attractions stem from some sort of choice, well, so do religious affiliations.
This shows that Symonds's understanding of the causation of same-sex desire goes beyond a straightforward congenital explanation that leaves no room for the force of influence.
That does not prove causation, of course.
But most psychotherapy doesn't address the social causation of mental illness either.
Causation, of course, is more difficult to interpret then correlation.
Correlation does not necessarily imply causation, of course.
Meiksins Wood seeks to explain the nature and causation of empire.
The causation of these experiences is problematic.
Determining the precise causation of LBP remains difficult.
And this is what philosophers of causation have done; there are probabilistic versions of "covering law" theories of causation, of counterfactual theories of causation, and so on, for all major theories of causation.
And second, the account is semantically unstable, since as Dowe asserts quasi-causation plays the same role as causation for explanation, decision theory and inference, that relation is a better deserver of the role of best fitting causation's connotations than Salmon-Dowe's 'genuine causation' (Dowe 2000, p. 296, n. 13; 2001, pp. 811-2).
