According to some writers (Hitchcock, 2007, Woodward, 2007), we should take seriously the possibility that causal reasoning and understanding apply most naturally to small world systems of medium sized physical objects of the sort studied in the various special sciences and look for an account of causation, like the interventionist account, that explains this fact.
We know that practicing evolutionary biologists attribute evolutionary change to selection, non-adaptive factors (e.g., genetic drift) or a combination of these two factors, but what do students' explanations of evolutionary causation look like?
This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.
The causation is like that of chemistry, where, for example, water is the product of the fusion of oxygen and hydrogen, and unlike the mechanical causation of mechanics, where (as Mill saw it not quite correctly [see Section 10, below] the product of several causes is merely the additive sum of the effects of those causes taken separately.
They claim that, just as our default position with respect to synchronic identity, causation, parthood, and the like is that they're unitary, the same is true of grounding.
Big, dramatic events, such as explosions, gun battles, and natural disasters, stick in our heads and stay there, undermining our ability to think objectively about things like causation, probabilities, and death rates.
Through actionable storytelling, play and music, younguns start to learn the most basic concepts behind programming, like causation.
The idea, Gupta tells us, is to get kids learning the rudiments of programming, like causation, through a simple programming language, actionable storytelling, music and play.
However, because causal dependence is not transitive like causation, the causal relation between c and e may not be matched by a causal dependence.
One thing inheres in another in virtue of being conceived through it, which, like causation, is a matter of conceptual involvement.
Forms like quantity, whiteness, alteration, diminution and so on belong to the first group, while relations of reason and respectus, like causation, difference, and so on, fall under the secondo one.
