If the transference account of causation is correct, then lack of causal responsibility does not imply inability to make a difference.
That we can clarify the meaning of a causal claim in this way is just what we would expect if a manipulability account of causation is correct.
Fehr, Boyd, Richerson and Henrich (personal communications) have confirmed that our characterization of their thinking about causality (in essence, that this is an instance of reciprocal causation) was correct, and that Gardner and his colleagues had misconceived their position.
But we cannot take this route, because if the causation formulation is correct, then all moral obligations are caused entirely by God's commanding/intending activity; there cannot be, then, this prior moral obligation to obey God that would serve as part of the explanans for the necessary connection between divine commands/intentions and moral obligations.
Whether it does so or not depends on what the correct theory of causation is; in particular, it depends on what the correct theory says about the relation between causation and law.
Gardner criticizes us for invoking other evolutionary processes (e.g. drift) as part of ultimate explanations, but his attribution of this "error" to our reciprocal causation stance is obviously not correct, since Dickins and Barton, who reject our position, make the same "error".
The missing element, the federal appeals court in New Orleans said, was that they had failed to prove "loss causation," that is, "that the corrected truth of the former falsehoods actually caused the stock price to fall and resulted in the losses".
The authors' report replicates those research findings but also highlights the complexity of unraveling association from causation and the importance of using the correct methodology when analyzing such data.
The right way of causation is non-deviant causation.
If externalism (either social or non social) is correct, then it raises an important puzzle for mental causation.
