"causal agency" is a correct and usable phrase in written English.
It refers to the entity or force that is responsible for causing something to happen or exist. It can be used in various contexts, such as in academic or scientific writing, legal documents, and even in everyday conversations. Example: "The rise in sea levels is primarily due to the causal agency of climate change." In this example, "causal agency" is used to explain the reason behind the rising sea levels, attributing it to the force of climate change.
The demons which haunt his universe are imperial elites, property markets (which he imagines as a causal agency, not an instrument) and racial ideologies.
Thus causal agency is limited to God and humans.
Thus, assigning causal agency is a much more difficult problem for explanations of polymorphism than it is for adaptation.
Certainly he denies that any creature can exercise fully independent causal agency, a view he thinks "the philosophers" have adopted.
Whether in fact William admits genuine causal agency among creatures, he clearly thinks that God alone can create from nothing.
The problem stems from an inability to formally represent the implicit influences that inform emergent organization, such as context, shifts in causal agency or scale, and self-reference.
"Causal" means the cause of something.
According to an agent-causal approach, agency is to be explained in terms of a kind of substance-causation: causation by the agent, construed as a persisting substance.
The explanation-based tracking of an agent is context-sensitive in that sense because it can provide the tracker with models and theories of the target's causal history, agency-making mechanisms, and historical context.
The but-for theory, endorsed by many legal and philosophical theorists including Mackie, has the heuristic advantage that a simple and often reliable way of ruling out the existence of causal connection between agency and harm is to ask whether the harm would in the circumstances have occurred in the absence of the agency.
The view is agency-centered because Reid develops his account of moral motives in light of his broadly agent causal account of agency and regulation account of autonomy, according to which our rational nature consists in our ability to regulate our conduct by appeal to the rational principles of action.
