Later critics would strongly object to his "pan-logism"—his a priori assumption that the categories of reason necessarily underlay the whole of reality, or being.
For example, Maria and Jemima can seemingly be identified with the traditional categories of "reason" (Jemima) and "sensibility" (Maria), but since such couples were usually male and female, Wollstonecraft's characterization challenges conventional definitions of gender.
Diagnostic categories of reason for admission were not assessed, although we excluded patients with diabetic ketoacidosis, as we believe they comprised a different patient experience than the typical ICU patient on intravenous insulin for blood glucose management.
In Tilly's view, we rely on four general categories of reasons.
"There are often two categories of reasons to do the right thing," he said.
Six categories of reasons were derived from data including: (1) partner issues, (2) family issues, (3) feelings of being alone, (4) inability to provide for material needs, (5) bodily symptoms and experiences, and (6) vague nonspecific reasons.
Based on a literature survey and a diary study in which chemical plant operators reported events involving recovery from self-made errors, complete with reasons why they would or wouldn't normally report this, we identified six categories of reasons for not reporting.
Professor Tilly argues that there are four primary categories of reason-giving and that we miss the boat when we fail to recognize - and then match - the type of argument our opponent is making.
We divided the reasons for pain or discomfort into three categories (category 1: missing materials in the occlusal surface or non-smoothed marginal ridge, category 2: deformation of attachments, and category 3: deformation of the tray) (Figure 1). Figure 1 Three categories of reasons for pain or discomfort.
Instead of the three categories of reasons discussed above, lesser moral status might involve two kinds of reasons (a stringent moral presumption against interference and a strong reason to aid, but no reason to treat fairly) or only one (a stringent moral presumption against interference, but no reason to aid or treat fairly).
The other categories of reasons would be handled similarly: when the benefit to be received, the cost of providing that benefit, and other similar factors are on a par, there is a strong reason to aid an unimpaired adult human being, but only some reason to aid a dog, and very little reason to aid a fish, and so on.
