This argument runs parallel to the argument provided by Millar in the case of meaning.
As in the case of meaning, we may distinguish between more or less direct arguments.
As in the case of meaning, the most common idea on the market is that the rules constitutive of content are rules that subjects having contentful mental states need to follow.
In this sense, a concept is 'used' whenever a subject has an intentional mental state.[36] As in the case of meaning, we distinguish between CE normativity, which is neutral on the question how content is determined, and CD normativity which takes the norms to be metaphysically primary.
If p is true it does not follow that S ought to believe p, and if p is false it merely follows that it is not the case that S ought to believe p – not that S ought not to believe p (Bykvist & Hattiangadi 2007: 280).[38] In response, normativists have made the same move as in the case of meaning, and suggested that the 'ought' in (NB1) is replaced with a 'may' (Whiting 2010: 216-217, 2013b: 12013b
As in the case of meanings, genres vary from age to age, culture to culture, and even individual to individual, and the interpreter therefore faces, and needs to resist, constant temptations falsely to assimilate a work's genre to other ones with which he is more familiar (e.g. Shakespearean "tragedy" to Sophoclean "tragedy," or vice versa).
Accordingly, we may now say that speech acts are cases of speaker meaning that can (but need not) be performed by speaker meaning that one is doing so.
The HPA said there had been 4,140 laboratory-confirmed cases of norovirus, meaning up to 1.19 million people could have contracted the illness this season, a 63% rise on the previous season.
Davis 1992 offers many cases of speaker meaning in the absence of reflexive communicative intentions.
In his groundbreaking discussion of implicature, Grice (1989) appears to treat conversational implicata as cases of speaker meaning.
