Sentence examples for cases of illusion from inspiring English sources
The veil of ideas objection also has controversial ramifications for cases of illusion or hallucination.
Some epistemologists privilege perceptual states that you are in only if you are not in cases of illusion or hallucination.
(For more discussion of views that exclude perceptual justification from cases of illusion or hallucination, see section 2.2).
A further question to be asked in this context is whether the disjunctivist should treat all cases of illusion as equivalent to cases of partial hallucination.
Another point of debate raised by McDowell's concerns whether it is possible to form demonstrative concepts of the shade represented in experience in cases of illusion, when the shade represented in experience differs from the shade of the thing seen.
First, he exploits the role of judgmental acumen in perceptual judgment in order to provide an alternative explanation of cases of illusion (or more generally of things looking ways that they are not).
Now, in many cases of illusions and hallucination, there won't be any ordinary red thing around for you to experience even if there seems to you to be a red thing present.
But, in cases of normal perception, the only physical things that have the properties that perceptually appear to us are the external objects that the direct realists say we are perceiving; and in cases of illusions and hallucinations, there are no physical things that have the properties that perceptually appear to us.
Now, given the proposed account of the case of illusion, that case cannot be distinguished from the case of delusion by appeal to the fact that, in the former, an environmental feature is experienced while, in the latter, there is no suitable environmental feature to be experienced.
The central thesis of disjunctivism is that while a perceptual experience in a case of illusion or hallucination may perhaps involve an awareness of something like sense-data or adverbial contents, the only object of experience in a case of veridical perception is a mind-independent material object.
If the subject in a case of vision and the subject in a case of illusion are equally justified, that will be trouble for approaches that give justifying privilege to the states of seeing that \(a\) is \(F\) or seeing \(a\)'s \(F\ ness.
