Taken in the dialectical sense, 'Socrates is white' and 'Socrates is whiteness' would both be true.
For example, the proposition, U, considered above is a grounds for doubting h, but h and U could both be true.
The implication is that, for Heidegger, one cannot straightforwardly subject the truth of one age to the standards of another, which means, for example, that contemporary chemistry and alchemical chemistry might both be true (cf. Dreyfus 1990, 261 2).
Similarly, a statement expressing a belief about identity can both be true and informative because the two singular terms that flank the identity sign in an identity statement have both a sense and a reference.
Reject the assumption, and the contradiction vanishes, insofar as the R-thesis and the R-antithesis can both be true, but for different domains: the former holds for phenomena explainable by us, the latter for phenomena not so explainable.
As we shall see momentarily, this puzzle is related to a second puzzle: the puzzle of how a statement expressing a belief about identity can both be true and informative.
However, Chisholm argued, for any material object statement P and for any sensory conditional (S & A) → (h E, there will be some other material object statement M about the circumstances of perception that is consistent with P, such that P and M can both be true while (S & A) → (h E is false.
The larger view of Aristotle's teachings enshrined in this interpretive shift is that Aristotle and Plato's view can both be true, and hence, harmonious, if they are understood as writing about different things, Aristotle about the sublunary world and Plato about the world beyond matter and change.
Because how could both be true?
How can both be true, except in reverie?
