Advocates of a methodology of discovery usually rely on a distinction between different justification procedures, justification involved in the process of generating new knowledge and justification involved in testing it.
These considerations suggest that one aspect of the debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is best understood as a debate about whether knowledge and justification can be understood in naturalistically acceptable causal and reliabilist terms or must be understood in terms of naturalistically suspect evaluative terms.
So justification has external conditions.[32] The debate over the structure of knowledge and justification is primarily one among those who hold that knowledge requires justification.
Laypersons will typically lack knowledge and justification about whether the past answers were correct.
But the requirement that a priori knowledge (and justification) be absolutely independent of all experience seems too stringent and suggests that all a priori knowledge (and justification) must rest on innate ideas.
Commonalities in the classical Indian approaches to knowledge and justification frame the arguments and refined positions of the major schools.
Perhaps most significantly, it suggests a way of thinking about knowledge and justification as arising in a "web of belief".
(Here 'standard' means 'standard for contemporary Anglo-American epistemology'.) They offer analyses or definitions of knowledge and justification.
(By contrast, methodism begins with criteria for knowledge and justification and then attempts to ascertain whether, on these criteria, we actually have any knowledge or justified beliefs).
(Stich, 1990) There is, however, a difference between the view that our pretheoretical beliefs are justified (or amount to knowledge), no matter what else is true of them, and the search for plausible general principles about knowledge and justification that have the result that those beliefs are justified.
