By contrast, the arguments for unlimited pancomputationalism pick a computation first, then slice and aggregate the physical system to fit the computational description, and finally generate the mapping between the two.
He argues that some Turing-style models describe computational operations over externalistically individuated Mentalese symbols.[5] In principle, one might embrace both externalist content-involving computational description and formal syntactic description.
It developed not into an open ended inquiry into the nature and causes of imagery, but a manichean struggle between the computational pictorialism championed by Kosslyn and his supporters, and the computational description theory still most ably and enthusiastically represented by Pylyshyn.
The theoretical and computational description of this zinc binding in proteins (as well as that of other transition metals) is difficult.
On the content-involving approach, there is no rigid demarcation between computational and intentional description.
In other words, the dispositional account requires the mapping between computational and physical descriptions to be such that the dispositional relations between the physical states are isomorphic to the relations between state transitions specified by the computational description.
For now, the causal account simpliciter requires only that the mappings between computational and physical descriptions be such that the causal relations between the physical states are isomorphic to the relations between state transitions specified by the computational description.
Another possible response to unlimited pancomputationalism is that its mappings fail to construct an isomorphism between the causal structure of the physical system and the state transitions specified by the computational description.
According to the simple mapping account, a physical system S performs computation C just in case (i) there is a mapping from the states ascribed to S by a physical description to the states defined by computational description C, such that (ii) the state transitions between the physical states mirror the state transitions between the computational states.
In other words, the pure counterfactual account requires the mapping between computational and physical descriptions to be such that the counterfactual relations between the physical states are isomorphic to the counterfactual relations between the computational states.
