Thus, Carnap suggested that mental predicates be treated as applying to material entities: for example, "Carnap sees green" could be taken as meaning "the body Carnap is in the state of green-seeing," the state of green-seeing being a purely physical state that explains the behavioral facts that led one to ascribe the predicate "sees green" to Carnap in the first place.
Behavioral facts always underdetermine mental ascription.
Again, behavioral facts underdetermine mental ascription, but with mutual beliefs, belief about beliefs, this problem multiplies.
Another stumbling block, in the case of analytical behaviorism, is the fact that the behavioral sentences that are intended to offer the behavioral paraphrases of mental terms almost always use mental terms themselves (see Chisholm 1957).
In its behavioral ecology, in fact, it resembles not so much a thrush, or even other bluebirds, as it does a scaled-down version of an American Kestrel (Falco sparverius).
In fact, behavioral economists agree that folks don't know what they'll want in 30 years.
In fact, behavioral economics suggests that such customers will spend more on concessions because they will feel as if the movie tickets were free.
In fact, behavioral scientist Dan Ariely insists that zero is a special price which not only decreases an item's cost but increases its value.
In fact, behavioral studies carried out in humans [2], honeybees [12] and mice [13] have clearly demonstrated the ability of these organisms to distinguish between chiral odorants, prompting several authors to postulate the existence of enantioselective ORs.
In fact, behavioral studies have shown that visual perception is not essential for an efficient development of working memory [25], [26], suggesting that other sensory modalities might compensate by providing the necessary spatial information.
