If the sentence is a future contingent, the truth value determined at a later time has no bearing on the correctness of the utterance.
For instance, if F(1 p is a future contingent, then F(1 p and F(1)~p are both 'indeterminate', but the conjunction F(1 p ∧ F(1)~p will be false and the disjunction F(1 p ∨ F(1)~p will be true.
But, where p is a proposition about a future contingent it is not true, whether the contingent state of affairs comes about or not; neither is its negation true; so the disjunction, "p or not-p" is not true.
Instead, they have looked for a theoretical basis on which we might hold that a future contingent is true (or false).
The propositions "a was known by God," and "a is known by God," although set in the past and present, are true and yet can never have been true, just like other propositions about the future, because they are about a, and a, as a future contingent, may still not happen.
It should be added that although it is still an open question how TRL-validity should be defined, this uncertainty does not influence the most important property of the true futurist theory, i.e., the fact that it suggests a semantical definition of what it means for a future contingent to be true.
There are several ways to try to resolve the problem of prophecy, which arises in cases where a future contingent event is predicted.
So one possible response to the difficulty here is simply to give up one half of the problem by denying that there are any future contingent events.
It follows that the antecedent cannot be true and future contingent propositions are not determinately true or determinately false.
In a deterministic world there are no future contingent statements in this sense.
