Alternatively, the subject knows that p on the basis of some justification j, but j does not entail the truth that p (see, e.g., Cohen 1988, p. 91; Fogelin 1994, pp. 88-9; and Jeshion 2000, pp. 334-5).
According to the standard account, the subject has fallibilistic knowledge that p when she knows that p on the basis of some justification j, and yet the subject's belief could have been false while still held on the basis of j (see, e.g., BonJour 1985, p. 26, and Lehrer 1990, p. 45).
Agreement, here, is not the basis of justification but, rather, justification flows from the legitimacy of the democratic processes invoked to draw normative conclusions.
If knowledge is defined as true belief, in which the belief is arrived at on the basis of watertight justification, then the scope of knowledge is limited to domains over which that species of justification is obtainable, and where strict constraints are placed on Gettier-type defeaters for the verification procedures that apply.
Presumably, what makes a claim of justification true is the basis of that justification.
The interviews are voluntary because under the Fourth Amendment, an involuntary detention for questioning might well be a "seizure" requiring justification, at a minimum, on the basis of some reason to suspect a particular individual of a particular crime.
Sustained or repeated adversarial editorial material concerning individuals or organisations will only be maintained on the basis of justification in the public interest with the written approval of the managing editor".
Four years into the Obama administration's vast expansion of the program, members of Congress and the public are still being denied access to internal legal memos, which purportedly serve as the basis of the legal justification for such killings.
When the subject knows that p on the basis of justification j, and P(p/j) is less than 1, the subject's knowledge is fallibilistic.
A standard answer is that intuition, or rational insight, is the basis of a priori justification.
He propagated a theory of evidence as the basis of justification partly similar to Brentano's (as far as the "direct indirect" and "a priori a posteriori" distinctions are concerned), partly in sharp contrast to it (because Meinong added the "evidence for presumption" [Vermutungsevidenz] to the "evidence for certainty").
