Perception is mere awareness of bare particulars without any identification or association with words for, according to Diṅnāga, such association always results in falsification of the object.
Thus cognition, in its perceptual aspect, has a dual form: subjectively, it discloses a bare consciousness that merely attends to the flow of sensations; objectively, it corresponds to each specific domain of empirical awareness: visual objects to visual awareness, sounds to auditory awareness, etc.
In bare attention--awareness free of ideas or concepts--we experience only a flow of body sensations, feeling states, ephemeral moods and on.
The possibility of such separation of bare affect from cognitive awareness may arise in Plato, who although he at Timaeus 64A-65B seems to take conscious feeling to be required for pleasure, in the passage cited by Moore writes of pleasure as though it is separable from full cognitive awareness — but valueless to the subject then (Philebus 21BC, 60DE).
The above quote, from the Washington Post, lays painfully bare the scope of awareness considered allowable in the American electoral process.
For him, bare sense-impressions cannot count as awarenesses because they are nor effective enough, nothing is accomplished by them and, they do not result in appreciable mental activity.
But this awareness is limited to their bare existence and fails to reveal their underlying nature.
Someone sympathetic to the simple picture who applies this distinction of Block's (Block 1995, 1997, 2002; Katz 2005b) might locate hedonic value in bare pleasure, rather than in any cognitive awareness of it.
"Girls are painting their nails and baring their midriffs and dressing like teenagers without awareness of what they're doing at an emotional and sexual level.
