These are inherently corrupt activities — what prosecutors sometimes call badges of fraud.
Under fraudulent conveyance law, the responsibility is based on whether there were "badges of fraud," which can include circumstantial evidence to infer fraudulent intent.
From Twyne's Case, the concept of the "signs and marks of fraud" would eventually become the Badges of Fraud which are found today in UVTA § 4(b).
This particular finding became one of the original "Badges of Fraud" and has survived in some form or another in Anglo-American law for over 400 years.
The way not to analyze the Badges of Fraud, as is sadly so often done in practice and occasionally by the courts, is to simply add up the Badges of Fraud for each side, and then engage in a "Navy beats Army 7-3" sort of analysis; such clearly runs against the spirit, as well as actual text, of § 4(b).
If there's a challenge, the judge will look at what's referred to as badges of fraud – any evidence that indicates that the transfer of property to the DAPT was made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.
Frankly, we should dispense with the Badges of Fraud in the text of § 4(b), amend that section to encourage the court to consider all facts and circumstances that might materially bear upon the divination of the debtor' s intent, and move the Badges back into the comments as mere guideposts of the sorts of things that the court should consider.
In addition to the foregoing facts, the bankruptcy court identified certain "badges of fraud" such as Debtor's close relationship with his wife, the timing of the transfers in relation to the FINRA action, Debtor's poor financial condition, and that substantially all of Debtor's property was transferred.
