The procedural approach argues that epistemically bad biases can be kept in check through an appropriate social organization of inquiry.
Antony suggests that epistemically good biases are ones that lead to finding out the truth, while epistemically bad biases lead away from the truth.
A social organization that holds people with different biases accountable to one another will be able to weed out bad biases, even if no individual on her own can be free of bias (Longino 1990).
Feminist standpoint theory, drawing originally from Marxist theory, raised a cluster of questions for analytic feminists: whether they can explain the political/material construction of standpoints in the production of knowledge, how they treat community-wide biases and assumptions, what criteria they use to distinguish "good" and "bad" biases, and so on.
Naturalized epistemology rejects the ideal of neutrality and instead gives us empirical norms by which to differentiate good from bad biases, that is, biases that lead us toward rather than away from truth (1993/2002, 113 116, 134 144).[10] Antony also engages in many other facets of the debate between analytic and non-analytic feminists to which we will return later.
"An important factor in what is driving the bad news bias is that we are hard-wired to pay attention to threats and alarming information, and the media capitalises on this".
But it's not entirely comprehensive, because I do think that the United States has a strong interest in sustaining the current era of global stability — which is quite real (the media's bad new bias notwithstanding), good for us and for the world, and founded in large part on our military pre-eminence.
That's not a bad institutional bias in such a diverse, sprawling nation as ours.
This is not a bad institutional bias for a diverse, sprawling nation such as ours.
Brines, who also astonishingly failed to award Celtic a late penalty on Tuesday, offered the latest evidence that Scotland's referees are bad, not biased.
