The phrase "awareness of objects" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used in contexts discussing perception, cognition, or attention, particularly in psychology or philosophy.
Example: "The study focused on the awareness of objects in the visual field and how it affects decision-making."
Alternatives: "perception of objects" or "recognition of objects".
Usually included in this category of phenomena are telepathy, or thought transference between persons; clairvoyance, or supernormal awareness of objects or events not necessarily known to others; and precognition, or knowledge of the future.
Vision, it seems, provides a rich felt awareness of objects in a spatial field an area where there are potential objects but where none currently reside (that is, we seem in vision to be able to see empty space).
Awareness of objects and events in and around the Geostationary Earth Orbit satellite belt is currently limited, and the situation is worsening as more satellites are added and the satellites trend toward smaller sizes.
Vision is a common model system in which to approach the question of whether certain neural processes are specifically correlated with awareness of objects in the external world.
We can explicate Nishida's first concern, with the ontology of consciousness, in the following way: If the basic form of consciousness did not have the reflexivity of self-awareness, then the "consciousness" of objects would be blind, as it were, like a mechanical or neurological reaction to stimuli with no awareness whatsoever, and no way to account for awareness.
The obvious problem with this is that it makes it hard to make sense of the historically common view that physical objects are not given, since the sensory awareness of physical objects in the most normal sorts of cases does not seem on the surface to be a product of inference.
Like sense-datum theorists, and unlike intentionalists, naive realists hold that such experiences themselves consist of relations of awareness to objects.
But no such objects are there in hallucinations, therefore, hallucinations are not cases of awareness of ordinary objects.
Since if we are not perceptually aware of ordinary objects in veridical experiences, it is unclear how any form of perceptual awareness of ordinary objects can be secured.
These results suggest that the neural response to an object and awareness of that object are dissociable in EEG recordings.
What proponents of sense data (or adverbial contents) will say, however, is that these points fail to show that the perceptual awareness of material objects is direct or immediate in the sense discussed earlier: no tendency to show that material objects (as common-sensically understood) are literally contained within or features of experience.
