The phrase "awareness in action" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used to describe a state of being conscious and engaged in a particular activity or situation, often implying mindfulness or intentionality.
Example: "The workshop focused on developing skills for awareness in action, helping participants to stay present and engaged during challenging situations."
Alternatives: "mindfulness in practice" or "conscious engagement".
Our program, Global Awareness in Action, focused on public health and H.I.V./AIDS.
Rachel Hurst, the director of Disability Awareness in Action, an international human rights network run for and by disabled people, becomes a Dame.
Conscious is literally awareness in action, and it takes mindfulness, if you will, to a whole new level.
Another way to think of this is to consider the sense of agency that is normally an aspect of pre-reflective self-awareness in action.
Primarily, the body attains self-awareness in action (or in our dispositions to action, or in our action possibilities) when it relates to something, uses something, or moves through the world.[4] Bodily self-awareness, like self-consciousness more generally, has limitations.
Increased binding of action is therefore more likely to reflect the deficits in the awareness of action in the more-affected hand in CBS.
With that new addition the unconscious action prediction process is coupled with the prior awareness state (as a higher order cognitive state) to facilitate the conscious aspects as proposed by Haggard et al.: predictive processes are also playing a role in action awareness (e.g. see [20, 21]).
Alternatively, retrospective action binding could reflect bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with on-going cognitive processes involved in action awareness, or, at a lower level, with the integration of visual information in the Libet clock paradigm typically deployed in these experiments (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983).
Our main hypothesis focused on the relation between awareness of action in patients, as quantified by action binding, and changes in grey matter.
The probability and timing of a sensory event given an action may affect re-construction of action awareness in a way that is distinct from the effects of contingency as shown by Moore et al. (2009).
