According to this naïve realist account, when one genuinely perceives the world one is directly aware of mind-independent objects and their features.
The claim that when one genuinely perceives the world one is directly aware of mind-independent objects and their features is not distinctive of the naïve realist account.
This is relevant to the Transparency Thesis (Harman, 1990; Martin, 2002) which states that, when we reflect on our perceptual experience, we are only aware of "mind-independent" objects.
Since one is not aware of mind-independent objects and their features when one hallucinates, the naïve realist cannot offer the same account of the phenomenal character of hallucinations.
According to this view our perceptual experiences are mental states with intentional contents that represent the world as being a certain way, and when one has an experience with a veridical content, in the right circumstances, one is directly aware of mind-independent objects in one's environment.
A theorist who denies that we are aware of mind-independent objects at all, directly or indirectly, but only of sense-data construed as mental entities, is known as a phenomenalist or an idealist about perception (see Foster (2000) for a recent defence, see Crane and Farkas (2004: Section 2) for an introduction to the subject; and the entry on idealism).
In the remainder of this article, sense data are understood in the sense articulated in section 1.1, and the Sense Data Theory is understood simply as the theory that there are such things, that is, that in perception one is directly aware of mind-dependent things that have the properties that perceptually appear to us.
That said, we must be mindful that the one who is becoming aware of the mind is not also being kidnapped by the mind.
The essay's job is to track consciousness; if you are fully aware of your mind you will find your thoughts doubling back, registering little peeps of ambivalence or disbelief.
Finally become aware of your mind and practice accepting your thoughts for what they are.
