The first (discussed at E1-5 II.xxi.23–24) is whether agents (human beings, persons) are free with respect to willing-one-way-or-another; more particularly, whether agents are able, if they so will, to avoid willing one way or the other with respect to a proposed action.
He argues that Locke answers the II.xxi.25 question negatively, but then claims that, for Locke, the power to suspend is not an ability to avoid willing, but rather an ability to will not to perform some action under consideration.
As Locke makes clear, this power to prevent the will's determination, that is, this power to avoid willing, is absent when the action proposed is to be done presently and involves the continuation or stopping of a process in which one is currently engaged (see Section 6 above).
In that case, one is free with respect to willing to do B if and only if (i) if one (actually) wills to do B, then one can will to do B, and (ii) if one (actually) avoids willing to do B, then one can avoid willing to do B. Given that actuality obviously entails possibility, it follows that (i) and (ii) are both obviously true.
It is for this reason that it is possible for me to avoid willing with respect to whether to get up right now: processes require volition to secure their continuation, but mere states (non-processes) do not (see Rickless 2000: 49–55; for a contrary view, see Glauser 2003: 710).
Meanwhile Pornhub will only receive willing applicants, avoiding a Komen-style rejection or Arbor Day-style anonymity.
In short, will people who avoid GMOs be willing to try a non-GMO product made by GM yeast?
During much of the cold war the two superpowers, anxious to avoid Armageddon, were willing to tolerate the status quo.
Hospitals who struggled with these new value-based initiatives and needed help improving their care coordination to avoid penalties were willing to pay a pretty penny for his advice.
