Spinoza here is explaining something about the relationship among attributes one may be conceived without the aid of the other and about the relation of the attributes to the substance, namely, that conceiving attributes independently is not evidence of the existence of independent substances.
Descartes calls the distinction between attributes of the same substance, and between a given attribute and its substance a "rational distinction," (Principles, I, §62, CSM, I, p. 214, AT 30) and so, insofar as Thought and Extension belong to the same substance for Spinoza, they would be, in Descartes' terminology, rationally distinct.[8] Spinoza however, says that they are "really distinct".
It thus had features closer to the more pantheistic picture of divine thought found in Spinoza, for example, for whom matter and mind were attributes of the one substance.
She holds that though we can know some of the attributes of these substances, we cannot know their true natures (Astell 2002, 173).
Formulations and containers can, in turn, influence structural attributes and stability profiles of biologics, potentially creating additional sources of variation in the physicochemical attributes of the active substances administered to patients [ 37].
8. "Finally, a conceptual distinction [read 'rational distinction'] is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction between two such attributes of a single substance.
Spinoza's inability to explain how movement and values derive from the attributes of the one, infinite substance does not, by itself, establish the theist explanation in Mendelssohn's view.
The following limitations need to be considered when interpreting our findings: Two major attributes of the determination of substance plasma concentrations are its high level of accuracy and objectiveness [ 28, 29].
This occurs most clearly where matter comes to be regarded as an attribute of the divine substance, so that God is no longer conceived of as a being distinct from nature but rather as the immutable and eternal imminent cause from which the plenitude of finite shapes in nature pours forth.
Curley, for example, holds that the identity is not one that holds between any given attribute and the substance, but rather between the totality of the attributes and the substance (Curley, 1988, 30). Bennett, on the other hand, believes Spinoza is simply overstating the case (Bennett, 1984, 64).
