What I do when I utter (5) is an attribution of a different sort: I attribute to myself a feeling state (an experience) which has an intentional content to the effect that a certain region of my body is in a physical condition of a certain sort.
No matter what I would like to imagine myself as, what traits I would like to attribute to myself, I am nothing but a woman.
No matter what I would like to imagine myself as, or what traits I would like to attribute to myself, I am nothing but a woman.
The idea is that if the representations I can attribute to myself possess a unity of the right kind, and if I apprehend or am cognitively sensitive to this unity, then I will be able to represent the apperceiving subject of any one of them as identical with that of any other.
Not that I would attribute to myself either the name or the role of a prophet Preface to César, 1555 [S]ome of [the prophets] predicted great and marvelous things to come: [though] for me, I in no way attribute to myself such a title here. Letter to King Henry II, 1558.
Nostradamus's reliance on historical precedent is reflected in the fact that he explicitly rejected the label "prophet" (i.e. a person having prophetic powers of his own) on several occasions: Although, my son, I have used the word prophet, I would not attribute to myself a title of such lofty sublimity Preface to César, 1555 (see caption to illustration above).
Two of these arguments are associated with famous political figures; a well-known economic forecaster was responsible for another; and one isn't associated with anybody in particular, so I'll attribute it to myself.
Second, my ability to attribute representations to myself as subject of them is pure, as opposed to empirical apperception.
Fortunately, however, the premise that each of my representations is such that I can attribute it to myself is not crucial for the argument from above.
