Sentence examples for attitudinal state from inspiring English sources

Furthermore, even if sincere assertions of moral sentences express the belief that one is in a certain attitudinal state, the content of that belief has different truth conditions from the sentence (Ridge 1999).

We would like there to be grounds to attribute the belief or acceptance of a moral judgment to those who are silent on some grounds, and it isn't clear exactly what resources are available to a non-cognitivist if it doesn't involve being in some attitudinal state.

Anand and Hacquard (2013) argue that this distributional puzzle is due to a substantive difference between the two types of attitude verbs representationality. According to them, attitudes of acceptance are "representational" (Bolinger 1968) in that this type of attitude verb describes the content of a propositionally consistent attitudinal state.

Many philosophers have held that attitudinal states per se already involve, constitutively, matters of rationality or normativity.

To do this, we designed a survey protocol that included both attitudinal questions and a stated-preference component.

The survey assessed interest in PEVs, explained UCC, and elicited openness to UCC through attitudinal questions and a stated choice experiment.

The theory of planned behaviour states that attitudinal variables (e.g. job satisfaction) only have an indirect effect on retention whereas intentions have a direct effect.

One contemporary view of pleasure, defended by Fred Feldman, has it that pleasure is an attitudinal state implicitly a genuinely monist state.[7] The upshot of this brief discussion is that monists must pay attention to the value they cite as the one value, and there may be fewer monist theories than it first appears.

Can American schools inch up the skills scale without sacrificing their place on the attitudinal scale?

Attitudinal accounts see consent as a mental state of affirmation or willingness, while performative accounts see it as a certain kind of action or utterance (for instance, saying "yes" or nodding).

Applying f to the latter gives us a proposition, f(Rent, p, A). 2 is therefore true because it states that there is an attitudinal object f(Rent, p, A) such that it is a thinning of some attitudinal object f Rbel, p, S).