The standards of correctness in normative judgment are generated by the attitude of valuing just as such (Street 2010, 369).
In fact, they take themselves to discharge the semantic task with their account of what is constitutive of the attitude of valuing (Bagnoli 2002, Street 2010).
This illustrates why it is not trivial to characterize fitting attitude theories of value in terms of attitudes deemed to be fitting that is, via response-dependency and normative reduction.
According to the most straightforward and ambitious form of the fitting attitude theory of value, to be valuable is to be the fitting object of some evaluative attitude.
At Duke and other similar institutions, with thousands of whirring brains and uniquely talented individuals, this attitude of relative value can grow to feel diminishing.
I will term these broadest and most ambitious forms of the view generic fitting attitude theories of value.
Issues of semantics aside, it will be helpful to differentiate the buck-passing account from the fitting attitude theory of value.
(ii) In Five Types Broad tentatively suggests a version of what is currently known as the The Fitting Attitude Analysis of value.
Fitting attitude theories of value are sometimes referred to as buck-passing accounts, and a burgeoning secondary literature concerns the viability of "passing the buck," especially about the good.
Brentano's views on ethics, for example, (which have gained more attention in English-speaking countries than in central Europe, probably because of the early English translation of Brentano's lecture on ethics (1902)), have been taken up in fitting attitude theories of value, which analyze ethical value in terms of correct or incorrect forms of approval or disapproval.
Would this prevent manipulation and promote a change of attitude in terms of values, such as respect and tolerance, in our generation?
