Yet the attitude contents are still wide.
If perceptual contents are wide and the environment is subject to change, we should expect a shift, even if the perceptual contents would not shift as readily as attitude contents would.
Some philosophers take attitudes to be relational in another way as well, namely that attitude contents depend on relations to the environment: e.g., one cannot desire water unless H2O is (or was) present in one's environment.
To this it may be rejoined that attitude contents are more tractable, in that they may yield to some view of aboutness according to which reference can divide for a time between contents such as blue and yellow.
The analysis focused on attitudes, content, frequency and comfort with adolescent-parent communication on sexuality and identified attitudes and gaps in knowledge and life skills.
Another response to this potential problem revises the thesis of representationalism, construing the representational properties that determine phenomenology as attitude-content complexes rather than contents alone.
Block contends that after some length of time a few days or a few millennia the victim's word meanings and propositional-attitude contents and all other intentional contents will shift to match the Inverted Earthlings' contents, but, intuitively, the victim's color qualities will remain the same.
If experiences have contents, then they will be structured by attitude and content: the experience will have content in an experiential way.
The natural and intuitive assignment of contents that first makes plausible construing pleasure as an attitude with content runs into problems when it is extended to a uniform attitude theory of the content of all pleasure, as Anscombe (1981c/1967) first observed.
However, one could hold that experiences are so structured (by attitude and content), while also holding that experiences have their contents in virtue of their connections to beliefs.
